The Quran

قاتِلُوا الَّذينَ لا يُؤمِنونَ بِاللَّهِ وَلا بِاليَومِ الآخِرِ وَلا يُحَرِّمونَ ما حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ وَرَسولُهُ وَلا يَدينونَ دينَ الحَقِّ مِنَ الَّذينَ أوتُوا الكِتابَ حَتّىٰ يُعطُوا الجِزيَةَ عَن يَدٍ وَهُم صاغِرونَ

Muhammad Asad

[And] fight against those who - despite having been vouchsafed revelation [aforetime]¹- do not [truly] believe either in God or the Last Day, and do not consider forbidden that which God and His Apostle have forbidden,² and do not follow the religion of truth [which God has enjoined uponthem]³ till they [agree to] pay the exemption tax with a willing hand, after having been humbled [in war].⁴

Lit., "such of those who were vouchsafed revelation [aforetime] as do not believe...", etc. In accordance with the fundamental principle - observed throughout my interpretation of the Qur'an - that all of its statements and ordinances are mutually complementary and cannot, therefore, be correctly understood unless they are considered as parts of one integral whole, this verse, too must be read in the context of the clear-cut Qur'anic rule that war is permitted only in self-defence (see 2:190-194, and the corresponding notes). In other words, the above injunction to fight is relevant only in the event of aggression committed against the Muslim community or state, or in the presence of an unmistakable threat to its security: a view which has been shared by that great Islamic thinker, Muhammad 'Abduh. Commenting on this verse, he declared: "Fighting has been made obligatory in Islam only for the sake of defending the truth and its followers... All the campaigns of the Prophet were defensive in character; and so were the wars undertaken by the Companions in the earliest period [of Islam]" (Manar X, 332).
This, to my mind, is the key-phrase of the above ordinance. The term "apostle" is obviously used here in its generic sense and applies to all the prophets on whose teachings the beliefs of the Jews and the Christians are supposed to be based - in particular, to Moses and (in the case of the Christians) to Jesus as well (Manar X, 333 and 337). Since, earlier in this sentence, the people alluded to are accused of so grave a sin as wilfully refusing to believe in God and the Last Day (i.e., in life after death and man's individual responsibility for his doings on earth), it is inconceivable that they should subsequently be blamed for comparatively minor offences against their religious law: consequently, the stress on their "not forbidding that which God and His apostle have forbidden" must refer to something which is as grave, or almost as grave, as disbelief in God. In the context of an ordinance enjoining war against them. this "something" can mean only one thing - namely, unprovoked aggression: for it is this that has been forbidden by God through all the apostles who were entrusted with conveying His message to man. Thus, the above verse must be understood as a call to the believers to fight against such - and only such - of the nominal followers of earlier revelation as deny their own professed beliefs by committing aggression against the followers of the Qur'an (cf. Manar X, 338).
See in this connection the statement (in 5:13-14) that the Jews and the Christians "have forgotten much of what they had been told to bear in mind".
Sc., "and having become incorporated in the Islamic state". The term jizyah, rendered by me as "exemption tax", occurs in the Qur'an only once, but its meaning and purpose have been fully explained in many authentic Traditions. It is intimately bound up with the concept of the Islamic state as an ideological organization: and this is a point which must always be borne in mind if the real purport of this tax is to be understood. In the Islamic state, every able-bodied Muslim is obliged to take up arms in jihad (i.e., in a just war in God's cause) whenever the freedom of his faith or the political safety of his community is imperilled: in other words, every able-bodied Muslim is liable to compulsory military service. Since this is, primarily, a religious obligation, non-Muslim citizens, who do not subscribe to the ideology of Islam, cannot in fairness be expected to assume a similar burden. On the other hand, they must be accorded full protection of all their civic rights and of their religious freedom: and it is in order to compensate the Muslim community for this unequal distribution of civic burdens that a special tax is levied on non-Muslim citizens (ahl adh-dhimmah, lit., "covenanted" [or "protected"] people", i.e., non-Muslims whose safety is statutorily assured by the Muslim community). Thus, jizyah is no more and no less than an exemption tax in lieu of military service and in compensation for the "covenant of protection" (dhimmah) accorded to such citizens by the Islamic state. (The term itself is derived from the verb jazd, "he rendered [something] as a satisfaction", or "as a compensation [in lieu of something else]" - cf. Lane II, 422.) No fixed rate has been set either by the Qur'an or by the Prophet for this tax; but from all available Traditions it is evident that it is to be considerably lower than the tax called zakah ("the purifying dues") to which Muslims are liable and which - because it is a specifically Islamic religious duty - is naturally not to be levied on non-Muslims. Only such of the non-Muslim citizens who, if they were Muslims, would be expected to serve in the armed forces of the state are liable to the payment of jizyah, provided that they can easily afford it. Accordingly, all non-Muslim citizens whose personal status or condition would automatically free them from the obligation to render military service are statutorily - that is, on the basis of clear-cut ordinances promulgated by the Prophet - exempted from the payment of jizyah: (a) all women, (b) males who have not yet reached full maturity, (c) old men, (d) all sick or crippled men, (e) priests and monks. All non-Muslim citizens who volunteer for military service are obviously exempted from the payment of jizyah. My rendering of the expression 'an yad (lit., "out of hand") as "with a willing hand", that is, without reluctance, is based on one of several explanations offered by Zamakhshari in his commentary on the above verse. Rashid Rida', taking the word yad in its metaphorical significance of "power" or "ability", relates the phrase can yad to the financial ability of the person liable to the payment of jizyah (see Manar X, 342): an interpretation which is undoubtedly justified in view of the accepted definition of this tax.